Sunday

Why are (some) physicists so bad at philosophy?

In his book of reminiscences “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!”, Richard Feynman tells the story of a painter who assured him that he could make yellow paint by mixing together red paint and white paint.  Feynman was incredulous.  As an expert in the physics of light, he knew this should not be possible.  But the guy was an expert painter, with years of practical experience.  So, ready to learn something new, Feynman went and got some red paint and white paint.  He watched the painter mix them, but as Feynman expected, all that came out was pink.  Then the painter said that all he needed now was a little yellow paint to “sharpen it up a bit” and then it would be yellow.

I was reminded of this story when I read this foray into philosophy by physics professor Ethan Siegel, which a reader sent me, asking for my reaction.  Do give it a read, though I’ll summarize it for you:  

Arguments for God as cause of the universe rest on the assumption that something can’t come from nothing.  But given the laws of physics, it turns out that something can come from nothing. 

Here was my reaction:

Is this guy serious?  The laws of physics aren’t “nothing.”  Ergo, this isn’t even a prima facie counterexample to the principle that ex nihilo, nihil fit.  That’s just blindingly obvious.  Is this guy serious? 

(Actually, that was not my reaction.  My actual reaction cannot be printed on a family-friendly blog.  This is the cleaned up version.)

Feynman’s painter insisted that you can get yellow paint from red paint and white paint.  All you need to do is add some yellow paint.  Similarly, Siegel assures us that we can get something from nothing.  All we need to do is to add a little something, viz. the laws of physics.  I’ll bet Siegel has read Feynman’s book and had a chuckle at the painter’s expense.  Little does he realize that the joke’s on him.

Notice that the point has nothing to do with the further question “Where do the laws of physics come from?”  It has nothing to do with the debate between atheism and theism.  It has nothing to do with whether Siegel’s purely scientific claims are otherwise correct.  I’m not addressing any of that here.  Let the operation of the laws of physics be a brute fact if you like; let atheism be true, if you insist; let Siegel be a whiz-bang crackerjack physicist, if you must.  The point is that as a philosopher, he’s utterly incompetent, incapable of seeing the most blatant of fallacies staring him square in the face.

Siegel is in good company, if that’s the right way to put it.  As I showed in my review of their book The Grand Design for National Review, Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow are no more philosophically competent than Siegel is.  Indeed, one of their errors is the same as Siegel’s: They tell us that “Because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing.”  Ignore for the moment the incoherence of the notion of self-causation (which we explored recently here and here).  Put to one side the question of whether the physics of their account is correct.  Forget about where the laws of physics themselves are supposed to have come from.  Just savor the manifest contradiction: The universe comes from nothing, because a law like gravity is responsible for the universe.

For some reason this particular fallacy seems to be a favorite of physicists.  (And I mean physicists, specifically, not scientists in general – even Richard Dawkins isn’t this bad.)  Consider Oxford physicist Vlatko Vedral’s recent book Decoding Reality: The Universe as Quantum Information.  I hate to pick on Vedral.  He seems like a nice fellow, and there is in his book none of the obnoxious condescension toward philosophy and theology one finds in Hawking and Mlodinow.  Unfortunately, though, Vedral is only slightly better informed about these subjects than Hawking and Mlodinow are.  (He thinks, for example, that “What caused God?” is a serious objection to the First Cause argument.)  Worse, the argumentation is incredibly sloppy.  Epistemological and metaphysical issues are relentlessly conflated.  Murkiness abounds.  For example, Vedral suggests that information “comes from nowhere” and is “created from emptiness” but also that “there is no other information in the Universe than that generated by us as we create our own reality.”  So, is he contradicting himself – saying both that information comes from nowhere and that it comes from us?  Or is he saying instead that information causes us and we in turn cause it, but that there is nothing outside this loop – which would entail a vicious explanatory circle (for the reasons spelled out in the posts on self-causation linked to above)?  Or (seeing as either of these interpretations would sink his position) does he have some third alternative in mind?  He never tells us, and (like Hawking and Mlodinow, who say similar things) seems blithely unaware that there is even a problem here.

More to the present point, Vedral claims that “creation out of nothing” can occur even without a Creator, and offers as evidence von Neumann‘s proposal “that all numbers could be bootstrapped out of the empty set by the operations of the mind.”  We’re back to Feynman’s painter: Yellow can come from non-yellow as long as you add a little yellow to the non-yellow; and something can come from nothing as long as we add a little non-nothing – “the operations of the mind” – to the nothing.  How much cleverer these physicists are than us mere philosophers!

It is no good trying to defend Siegel, Hawking and Mlodinow, or Vedral by suggesting that perhaps they are not using “nothing” in a strict sense.  For each of them claims to be addressing the same issue that defenders of the First Cause argument for God’s existence are addressing, and the latter are using “nothing” in the strict sense.  So, these physicists can be acquitted of the charge of contradicting themselves only if they are guilty instead of sloppy thinking, and of loudly shooting off their mouths without doing their homework first.

And that is enough to merit them our scorn.  Philosophers and theologians are constantly told that they need to “learn the science” before commenting on quantum mechanics, relativity, or Darwinism.  And rightly so.  Yet too many scientists refuse to “learn the philosophy” before pontificating on the subject.  The results are predictably sophomoric.  What an arrogant and clueless amateur like Hawking or Dawkins needs to hear before putting on his philosopher’s toga is this.  And if he doesn’t get the message, this.  Instead, the reaction from equally clueless editors, journalists, and “educated” general readers is: “Gee, he’s a scientist!  He’s good at math and stuff.  He must know what he’s talking about!”  It really is no more intelligent than that. 

C. D. Broad took the view that “the nonsense written by philosophers on scientific matters is exceeded only by the nonsense written by scientists on philosophy.”  And that was in the days of scientists like Eddington, Einstein, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger, who actually knew something about philosophy.  (We’ve discussed a couple of these thinkers in earlier posts, here and here.)  Things had gotten worse by the time Paul Feyerabend wrote the following to Wallace Matson:

The younger generation of physicists, the Feynmans, the Schwingers, etc., may be very bright; they may be more intelligent than their predecessors, than Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Boltzmann, Mach, and so on.  But they are uncivilized savages, they lack in philosophical depth… (Quoted in Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, For and Against Method)

And things are even worse now.  Feynman was notoriously hostile to philosophy, but when his work on quantum mechanics brought him up against its inherent philosophical difficulties, he at least had the humility not to claim he knew how to resolve them.  Hawking and Vedral, by contrast, confidently peddle as “science” the kind of schlock you’d expect to find in the New Age section at Borders. 

What accounts for this decline?  Feyerabend blamed the “professionalization” of science, and there is much to be said for this.  We noted recently how John Heil and Stephen Mumford have decried the baneful effects “professionalization” has had on contemporary academic philosophy – hyper-specialization, smug insularity, careerist conformism, an emphasis on cleverness over depth.  Lee Smolin (who knew and respected Feyerabend) is one physicist who has argued that some of these same problems afflict contemporary physics.

One thing of which contemporary philosophers tend not to be guilty, however – scientism-whipped as they are – is ignorance of science, certainly not where science touches on their areas of philosophical specialization.  Hawking and Mlodinow assure us in The Grand Design that “philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics.”  No one at all familiar with the explosion of serious work in philosophy of physics, philosophy of chemistry, and philosophy of biology over the last several decades – not to mention the work of writers like William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith in the philosophy of religion, or the Churchlands in philosophy of mind – could say such a thing.  (True, as philosophers the Churchlands are hopeless.  But one thing they do know – perhaps, one sometimes suspects, the only thing they know – is neuroscience.)

Hawking and Mlodinow are guilty of just the sort of ignorance of which they falsely accuse philosophers.  But they are unlikely ever to know it.  The Hawkings, Dawkinses, and Jerry Coynes of the world have been dancing the Myers Shuffle around their echo chamber for so long that they can only ever hear each other’s mutual congratulations shouted down the conga line.  Until this childishness is universally treated with the sort of contempt it deserves, we will not have a sane intellectual culture, one in which the deepest philosophical, theological – and, indeed, scientific – questions can be fruitfully debated. 

Saturday

UFL Conference at Notre Dame

Frank Beckwith informs us that the 21st annual University Faculty for Life conference will be held this year at the University of Notre Dame on June 10-11.  Paper submissions are due April 3.  See Frank’s site for more information.

Tuesday

TLS at Gonzaga

Readers in the vicinity of Spokane, WA might be interested to know that I will be speaking on February 15 and 16 at the Faith and Reason Institute at Gonzaga University.  The lectures will be based on themes from The Last Superstition.  Details can be found here.

Monday

Putnam on causation, intentionality, and Aristotle

For the last three centuries a certain metaphysical picture suggested by Newtonian or Galilean physics has been repeatedly confused with physics itself.  (More recently, metaphysical pictures suggested by biology and by computer science have been confused with those subjects themselves, in much the same way.)  Philosophers who love that picture do not have very much incentive to point out the confusion – if a philosophical picture is taken to be the picture endorsed by science, then attacks on the picture will seem to be attacks on science, and few philosophers will wish to be seen as enemies of science.

Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (p. 19)

I recall that, while in grad school, a fellow student and I once lamented that Hilary Putnam – who by the 1980s had abandoned the scientism and naturalistic reductionism that had characterized his early work – had gone soft philosophically.  I think this was a common attitude in those days.  What idiots we were.  In fact Putnam had become an even more serious, nuanced – and indeed rigorous – thinker than he already had been.  That is why he took the turn he did: He saw that the dogmas to which he had been committed (and to which so many contemporary academic philosophers still are committed) simply did not do justice to the facts, to the richness and complexity of the real world.

A central yet insufficiently appreciated element of Putnam’s critique of naturalism is his view that intentionality cannot be accounted for in causal terms, and that (the relevant notion of) causation itself cannot be accounted for in physicalistic terms.  (This is related to, but distinct from, his well-known “model-theoretic argument” against certain versions of realism.)  This is a theme that crops up over and over again in Putnam’s later work.  It is most fully developed in his 1992 book Renewing Philosophy – a volume filled with interesting things, and which anyone who wants to understand contemporary analytic philosophy should read.  Important relevant material is also to be found in his paper “Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical?” (available in his collection Realism with a Human Face), his book The Many Faces of Realism, and his paper “Aristotle after Wittgenstein” (in his collection Words and Life). 

Causal theories of intentionality try to show that a neural state or process B will represent or stand for some object, event, or process A if B is caused by A in the right sort of way.  If a certain neural structure bears the right sort of causal relation to cats, for example, then it will represent cats.  The trick is to spell out what the “right” sort of causal relation involves, in a way that avoids certain well-known counterexamples.  (We looked at how Fred Dretske tries to accomplish this in an earlier post.)  Biological or “biosemantic” theories of intentionality are essentially a Darwinian riff on the causal approach, tracing the causal chains claimed to underlie intentionality beyond our immediate environment and back to the environment in which the brains of our ancestors were shaped by natural selection.

Putnam does not think either sort of theory can work.  Take the latter first.  Biosemantic theories claim that a neural state or process B will represent some object, event, or process A if B was selected for because of some advantage it provided vis-à-vis A.  So, consider the suggestion that a certain neural “data structure” evolved in dogs to facilitate their getting meat, and that this justifies us in attributing to them a concept or “proto-concept” of meat (Renewing Philosophy, pp. 27-33).  As Putnam points out, a dog will be satisfied and nourished whether it is given fresh meat, canned meat, or some textured vegetable protein that looks, smells, and tastes exactly like meat.  For that reason, there is no fact of the matter about whether its putative “proto-concept” represents any one of these in particular, and thus no sense to be made of the question of whether the dog has a true belief about what it is eating when it eats the vegetable protein rather than meat.  “Evolution didn’t ‘design’ dogs’ ideas to be true or false, it designed them to be successful or unsuccessful” (Renewing Philosophy, p. 31). 

But in that case, Putnam says, the suggestion that the dog really has a “proto-concept” of meat in the first place is groundless:

[T]he whole idea that a unique correspondence between the data structure and meat is involved in this bit of natural selection is an illusion, an artifact of the way we described the situation.  We could just as well have said that the data structure was selected for because its action normally signals the presence of something which has a certain smell and taste and appearance and is edible.  (Renewing Philosophy, p. 31)

In short, there is nothing in the situation described that entails that anything in the dog’s brain corresponds to meat specifically, and thus there is nothing in the situation that entails that the dog has a concept (or “proto-concept”) of meat.  The point is completely general, applying to any concept.  Natural selection favors survival value, not truth or falsity.  Hence you are not going to get truth or falsity from natural selection, and neither will you get from it the concepts that thoughts and statements – the sorts of things that are susceptible of being either true or false – presuppose.

Indeed, the very idea that the evolutionary processes under discussion have anything to do with explaining the origin of intentionality in the first place is an illusion.  After all, gazelles’ legs were favored by natural selection because they allowed gazelles to run fast and thereby to escape predators.  But no one suggests that this shows that a gazelle’s leg has the concept of running fast, or the thought that now would be a good time to run.  As Putnam writes:

Isn’t it with dogs as with gazelles?  Dogs which tended to eat meat rather than vegetables when both were available produced more offspring (gazelles which ran faster than lions escaped the lions and were thus able to produce more offspring).  Just as we aren’t tempted to say that gazelles have a proto-concept of running fast, so dogs don’t have a proto-concept of meat…  The “reference” we get out of this bit of hypothetical natural selection will be just the reference we put in our choice of a description.  Evolution won’t give you more intentionality than you pack into it.  (Renewing Philosophy, pp. 32-22)

In other words, in order to make the evolution of certain neural structures relevant to the explanation of intentionality, a “biosemantics” theorist has to presuppose that such neural structures “represent” the external world in a way that the gazelle’s leg structure (say) does not; he is reading intentionality into the biological facts, not deriving it from them.

Causal theories also subtly presuppose what they are purporting to explain.  Criticizing Jerry Fodor’s version of the causal theory, Putnam notes that in everyday claims about causation, we typically distinguish between “contributory causes” or “background conditions,” on the one hand, and “the cause” of an event on the other.  For example, if we say that a stuck valve caused a certain pressure cooker to explode, we are treating the stuck valve differently than the way we treat (say) the lack of holes in the vessel of the pressure cooker, even though the latter also played a role in the explosion.  The lack of holes we treat as a contributory cause or background condition; the stuck valve we treat as “the cause,” as being of special significance.  Putnam observes:

Yet, in the physics of the explosion, the role played by the stuck valve is exactly the same as the role of [the lack of holes]: the absence of either would have permitted the steam to escape, bringing down the pressure and averting the explosion. (The Many Faces of Realism, pp. 37-38)

For in fundamental physics, at least, one usually ignores the distinction between contributory causes and “the cause”, and tries to provide a formalism which shows how all of the factors interact to produce the final result.  (Renewing Philosophy, p. 50)

Though it has no unique significance to the physics of the situation, we treat the stuck valve as special, Putnam says, because of our interests.  We take it that

the valve ‘should have’ let the steam escape – that is its ‘function’, what it was designed to do.  On the other hand, the surface element [present where a hole might otherwise have been] was not doing anything ‘wrong’ in preventing the steam from escaping; containing the steam is the ‘function’ of the surface of which [this element] is a part.  So when we ask ‘Why did the explosion take place?’, knowing what we know and having the interests we do have, our ‘explanation space’ consists of the alternatives:

(1) Explosion taking place

(2) Everything functioning as it should

What we want to know, in other words, is why 1 is what happened as opposed to 2.  We are simply not interested in why 1 is what happened as opposed to such alternatives as:

(3) The surface element … is missing, and no explosion takes place. (The Many Faces of Realism, p. 38)

Now, insofar as the distinction between “the cause” and contributing or background conditions is in this way “interest-relative” and “context-sensitive,” it presupposes the existence of our powers of representation or intentionality, for

being interested in something involves, albeit in a slightly hidden way, the notion of “aboutness”, that is, the central intentional notion.  To be interested in something, in this sense, you have to be able to think about it – you have to be able to refer to it, in thought or in language.  (Renewing Philosophy, p. 50)

The reason this is significant is that the aim of a causal theory is to explain intentionality or representation in purely physical terms – terms that make no reference to concepts other than those recognized by physical science.  Yet given their actual examples, causal theorists in fact help themselves to a “notion of things ‘causing’ other things [which] is not a notion… simply handed to us by physics” (Renewing Philosophy, p. 50) – namely, the everyday notion that presupposes the interest-relative distinction between “the cause” and contributing or background conditions.  That is to say, they make reference to ordinary objects – cats, the valves on pressure cookers, and the like – in a way that gives them a causal significance they do not have in the sorts of explanations physics offers.  Nor is it easy to see how these theorists can avoid doing this, given that their aim is precisely to explain how we can represent such everyday objects in thought and language.  But in doing it they are subtly presupposing the existence of intentionality – the very phenomenon they are supposed to be explaining.

The bottom line, as Putnam puts it in “Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical?”, is that “Nature, or ’physical reality’ in the post-Newtonian understanding of the physical, has no semantic preferences” (p. 83, emphasis mine).  There is nothing in the physical facts so conceived that can determine why any particular causal chain “can be singled out as ‘the’ relation between signs and their referents” (p. 89).  On the Aristotelian conception of nature championed by the medieval Scholastics, material substances and processes were inherently “directed towards” certain ends or “final causes” beyond themselves, given their “essences” or “substantial forms.”  A kind of meaning was built into the material world from top to bottom.  But the early modern philosophers and scientists defined themselves against this essentialist and teleological view of nature, embracing a “mechanistic” picture of the world as devoid of any inherent formal or final causes – a picture contemporary naturalists take for granted.

Yet, as Putnam argues, causal theorists of intentionality, though officially committed to the anti-Scholastic, anti-Aristotelian revolution of the early moderns, are also implicitly beholden to “a notion according to which what is normal, what is an explanation, what is a bringer-about, is all in the essence of things in themselves”; and they are thereby beholden, in effect, to “a medieval notion of causation” (p. 88, emphasis added).  For the idea that there is an “intrinsic distinction” between the cause of an event and mere background conditions “has much more to do with medieval (and Aristotelian) notions of ‘efficient causation’ than with post-Newtonian ones” (The Many Faces of Realism, p. 26).  It presupposes an “Aristotelian conception of form” – of “self-identifying structures” which objectively demarcate the ordinary objects of our experience from each other in a way they are not demarcated by modern physics (“Aristotle after Wittgenstein,” pp. 68-69).  And if we implicitly affirm such notions in the course of giving a causal account of intentionality, “then we abandon materialism without admitting that we are abandoning it” for in that case we “project into physical systems properties… that cannot be properties of matter ‘in itself,’” at least not given the post-Newtonian conception of matter to which materialists are committed (“Causal Structure,” p. 90).

Here, and in the quote with which I began this post, Putnam might sound a bit like the author of The Last Superstition (minus the polemics and right-wing politics, anyway).  Indeed, Putnam allows that the considerations he raises are “grist for the mill of a possible latter-day Aristotelian metaphysics,” and that an Aristotelian might naturally respond “I told you so.  You cannot do without the notion of form” (“Aristotle after Wittgenstein,” p. 69).  As I have noted many times (e.g. here), materialists constantly help themselves to concepts to which they are not entitled given their basic assumptions about the nature of matter, but which make perfect sense on a broadly Aristotelian or Scholastic set of assumptions.  They don’t see this because most of them know, if anything, only caricatures of Aristotelianism and Scholasticism.  Nor, given the ideological interests noted by Putnam, do they have much incentive to try to see beyond the caricatures.

Putnam, a better informed and non-ideological philosopher, does see what is going on.  But he does not himself go in a neo-Aristotelian direction, opting for pragmatism instead.  I’ll address his reasons in a future post.  (Meanwhile, our pal Bill Vallicella has recently posted on Putnam’s argument himself.  Take a look.)

Saturday

Hot for Hayek

This chick really digs F. A. Hayek.  Too bad for her he’s already got a Companion.

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